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TAXATION
By JAMES

H.

WILSON, JR.*

The decisions of the Georgia appellate courts and the legislative enactments of the General Assembly of Georgia during the period from June
I, 1949, to June i, i95o, in the field of taxation reflect in large part the
pressing need for thorough revision of the state's tax structure.
The General Assembly met twice during the period. The extraordinary
session of July, 1949, was devoted almost entirely to consideration of
revenue measures. It was called by the governor to enact "emergency
revenue measures to relieve the grave fiscal crisis now confronting the
State governmental functions of education, health, public welfare assistance and highways" and to make corresponding increases in appropriations.
The emergency revenue measures enacted were temporary rate increases
in existing tax measures. In the field of special excise taxes, the gasoline
tax rate was increased from six cents to seven cents per gallon, 1 and the
rates of taxation of tobacco, 2 malt beverages and wines' were also increased. All these excise rate increases are to remain effective until June
30, 195 1, when by the terms of the 1949 emergency legislation the previous

rates will become effective again. Another favorite tax whipping boy of
legislators-the corporation-felt the effects of the revenue emergency.
The corporate income tax rate was increased from S2 % to 7% for the
calendar years 1949 and 195o, or such portions of a taxpayer's fiscal

years as fall within those periods." After expiration of the calendar year
195o, the old rate will become effective again, unless another emergency
causes the legislature to change its mind.
The growing demands for increased state services and the mounting
needs of the state for revenue, as well as proposals to abolish the state
ad valorem property tax, have caused some observers to wonder whether
the emergency rate increases of 1949 will be temporary after all, even
if a thorough revision of the state's tax structure is accomplished and a
*Associate of the firm of Sutherland, Tuttle and Brennan, Atlanta and Washington,
D. C.; A.B., 1940, Emory University; LL.B., 1943 (1947), Harvard University;
Member Georgia Bar Association.
1. Ga. Laws Ex. Sess. 1949, p. 19, GA. CODE ANN. § 92-1403 (Temp. Supp. 1949).
2. Ga. Laws Ex. Sess. 1949, p. 8, GA. CODE ANN. §§ 92-2202, 2208, 2209 and 2239
(Temp. Supp. 1949). The cigarette tax rate was increased from three cents per
package of 20 standard cigarettes, and the rates on cigarettes of non-standard size
and packaging were raised accordingly. The increase in the rates of tax on cigars
ranged from ten cents per thousand on cigars costing not more than three and onethird cents to one dollar and a half per thousand on cigars costing twenty-one
cents or more.
3. Ga. Laws Ex. Sess. 1949, p. 5, GA. CODE ANN. §§ 58-705, 58-901 (Temp. Supp.
1949). The rate on demestic wines of not more than 14% alcoholic content was
hiked from five cents to ten cents per gallon, and the rate on foreign wine of the
same classification was raised from fifty cents to one dollar per gallon. On wines
of more than 14% alcoholic content, both foreign and domestic, the rate was raised
from one dollar to two dollars per gallon. The excise on malt beverages was increased from four and one-half dollars to nine dollars per 31 gallon container and
from two cents to four cents per 12 ounce container.
4. Ga. Laws Ex. Sess. 1949, p. 18, GA. CODE ANN. § 92-3102 (Temp. Supp. 1949).
( 220 )
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general sales tax law is enacted. Although the temporary excise increases
apparently have boosted the state's revenue considerably, Georgia's tax
rates on gasoline, alcoholic beverages and tobacco products are among
the highest in the nation, and tax experts often warn that because of buyer
resistence there is a point of diminishing returns in increasing excise rates.
In the present state of the economy that point apparently has not been
passed except perhaps with respect to the warehouse charges on whiskey,
the income from which declined in the fiscal year ended June 30, 1950,

after an increase of one dollar per gallon by administrative order in July,
1949. With respect to the corporate income tax rate, of course, making that
too high in comparison with other states can deter businesses from establishing plants, warehouses and branch offices in Georgia. Whether allowing the
temporary rate increases enacted by the 1949 special session to expire
automatically would be wise in the long run from the standpoint of revenue
production, or whether they could be made permanent without damage to
the revenue, is a question for the tax economist. It should be obvious,
however, that whether or not these rate increases remain effective some
new source of revenue will be needed to finance the increased state services
which are being demanded.
That was obvious when the 1949 rate increases were adopted, and there
was much clamor for devoting the regular session of the General Assembly
in 195o primarily to tax legislation. That session did not turn out to be a
"tax session," however; there was no general revision of the tax structure
and no tapping of new sources of revenue. Proposals to overhaul the income tax system generally and to abolish the so-called "nuisance" taxes
failed to pass, as did proposals for a general sales tax.' The undercurrent
for sweeping tax changes at the 195o legislative session, nevertheless, was
perhaps a portent of things to come. The same may be said of a large
group of the cases on taxation decided by the Georgia appellate courts
during the period under discussion. The fact situations in some of these
cases reveal the struggle of state, county and municipal tax authorities
to find new sources of revenue for ever-increasing needs by stretching their
inadequate tax systems beyond their proper scope.
That is the general picture of taxation in Georgia during the past year.
The details may best be examined by grouping the statutes and cases under
types of taxes.
INCOME TAX

The major tax legislation at the regular session of the General Assembly in i95o, an amendment to Code Section 92-3113,

dealing with

allocation and apportionment of coroorate income,' probably had its inspiration in part from a tax case which has only now reached the appellate
court. This was the decision of the Superior Court of Fulton County in
Redwine v. Dan River Mills, Inc.,7 now before the Supreme Court of
5. At the 1950 session the legislature did increase the annual aDpropriation for the
State Revenue Department by $310,000.00. Ga. Laws 1950, p. 360. No doubt larger
appropriations for more rigid enforcement of existing state revenue laws could
increase the revenue considerably.
6. Ga. Laws 1950, p. 299.
7. No. A-10828. Super. Ct. Fulton County, Ga., Dec. 12, 1949, reported in CCH Ga.
Tax Rep. V 14-527.
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Georgia on the State Revenue Commissioner's bill of exceptions. Although
not yet decided by the Supreme Court, this case is worthy of examination,
not only because of its bearing on the above-mentioned legislation but also
because of the importance for many corporations, at least with respect to
past years, of the ultimate decision on a point of first impression.
Section 92-3 113 of the Code of Georgia, before amendment at the i95o
session, imposed a tax on the net income allocable to Georgia of every domestic corporation and every foreign corporation "owning property or
doing business in this State." The term "doing business" was not defined. In Redwine v. Dan River Mills, Inc. the Fulton Superior Court held
that a foreign corporation which had no manufacturing plant or warehouse
in Georgia but only an office staffed by a few salaried employees, who made
no sales or collections but merely solicited orders in a territory covering
Georgia and several other Southern states and transmitted them to the
home office in Virginia, which accepted or rejected the orders and, if it
accepted them, shipped the goods FOB the mill or warehouse in Virginia, was not doing business in Georgia within the meaning of the Georgia income tax law prior to the i95o amendment. Judge Bond Almand so
held on June 9, 1949, in overruling the State Revenue Commissioner's
general demurrer to the affidavit of illegality filed by Dan River Mills to
the Commissioner's levy of a writ of fieri facias for collection of income
taxes allegedly due for 1946. After a trial on the merits, Judge Ralph
H. Pharr, on December 12, 1949, directed a verdict for Dan River Mills,
finding no significant variation between the evidence and the facts alleged
in the affidavit of illegality
In an opinion filed with his order overruling the general demurrer, Judge
Almand stated that the question involved has not been determined by
the Georgia appellate courts. He relied upon the reasons given by him
for his decision on December 1, 1947, overruling general demurrers to a
petition seeking refunds of Georgia income taxes filed by Lipton Tea Company. The Lipton Tea Company case involved a fact situation substantially the same as that in the Dan River Mills case. In his Lipton Tea opinion,
Judge Almand pointed out that under Georgia appellate decisions Lipton
Tea Company was not doing business in Georgia so as to be subject to
service of process and suit in this state,1" nor was it doing business here so
8. Ibid.
9. Lipton Tea Company v. Phillips, No. 161440, Super.Ct. Fulton County, Ga., Dec. 1,
1947. Subsequently a final judgment for the taxpayer was entered under a settlement, perhaps because the Commissioner preferred to test the issue on appeal first
in another case.
10. Judge Almand cited Vicksburg, Shre'eport & Pac. Ry. v. DeBow, 148 Ga. 733, 98
S.E. 381 (1919) and Southeastern Distribution Co. v. Nordyke & Marmon Co., 159
Ga. 150, 125 S.E. 171 (1924). Since the opinions in these cases indicate that the court
felt compelled by the due process clauses of the Federal and State Constitutions to
construe the Georgia statutes on service of process as not permitting service on a
foreign corporation whose only activities in the state were in the nature of solicitation, it is interesting to speculate what effect it may have in future cases involving
this point that the trend of federal authority is now toward permitting service on a
foreign corporation whose only activities in the state consist of solicitation, at least
where there is some other factor connecting the corporation with the state, such as
maintenance of an office or sample rooms, or residence of salesmen in the state.
Cf. International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90
L.Ed. 95, 161 A.L.R. 1057 (1945). This federal trend, of course, by no means con-
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as to make Georgia the business situs of its credits owed by Georgia customers and thereby subject it to the imposition of an ad valorem property tax
here on such intangible property." He thought the same concept of "doing business" had been applied under the Georgia Income Tax Law in
the converse situation in Montag Bros., Inc. v. State Revenue Comm' n.," in
which the Georgia Court of Appeals held that the entire net income of a
Delaware corporation domesticated in Georgia, which did all its manufacturing in Georgia, managed and directed its business here, and shipped
all goods from its Atlanta plant, was subject to the Georgia income tax,
since mere solicitation activities from New York and Illinois sales offices
did not make any of the net income apportionable to those other states.
Judge Almand distinguished the case of Parke, Davis & Company v.
Cook, 3 which subjected a foreign corporation to a Georgia income tax, on
the ground that in that case the corporation kept a warehouse in Georgia
and the actual delivery of goods was made in Georgia, although only after
orders were approved at Baltimore.
The Dan River Mills case is on the calendar of the Supreme Court of
Georgia for argument this fall. Since the judgment for the taxpayer in the
superior court, the Supreme Court has announced a decision which may
provide a strong indication of the outcome of the Dan River Mills case.
In Suttles v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co., 1" a non-resident corporation sued
to enjoin the collection of state and county ad valorem taxes for 1941
on its accounts receivable arising out of sales of goods to residents of Georgia. After the corporation introduced evidence showing that its Atlanta
offices engaged only in soliciting and promotional activities, that all orders received in the Atlanta offices were subject to approval by the home
office in Ohio, and that title to any goods sold to Georgia customers passed
to the purchaser upon delivery to the common carrier outside Georgia, the
trial judge directed a verdict for the plaintiff. In affirming, the Supreme
Court held that the corporation was not doing business in Georgia and
that consequently the commercial tax situs of the intangibles sought to be
trols the Georgia court's application of the due process clause of the Georgia Con-

stitution.

11.

12.
13.

14.

Judge Almand also cited Dennison Mfg. Co. v. Wright, 156 Ga. 789, 120 S.E. 120
(1923), holding that the interstate commerce clause of the United States Constitution forbids an occupation tax on the Georgia agent of a foreign corporation whose
activities in Georgia were similar to those of Dan River Mills. The court said the
foreign corporation was engaged exclusively in interstate commerce. Cf. City of
Atlanta v. Freedom Oil Works Co., 188 Ga. 204, 3 S.E.2d 595 (1939).
The cases cited for this were Davis v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 196 Ga. 304, 26
S.E.2d 618 (1943) and Davis v. Penn Mutual Life Ins. Co., 201 Ga. 821, 41 S.E.2d
406 (1947). The question in each case was whether a non-resident insurance company engaged in sufficient local activities in Georgia in connection with real estate
loans to residents of Georgia to subject the notes given for the loans to ad valorern
taxation by Georgia.
50 Ga. App. 660, 179 S.E. 563 (1935). Cf. Interstate Bond Co. v. State Revenue
Comm'n., 50 Ga. App. 744, 179 S.E. 559 (1935).
198 Ga. 457, 31 S.E.2d 728 (1944). In his Dan River Mills opinion, Judge Almand
also distinguished Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. v. Phillips, 76 Ga. App. 825,
47 S.E.2d 183 (1948), which the Court of Appeals had decided against the taxpayer
since his Lipton Tea opion. In the Twentieth Century-Fox case, the taxpayer
distributed film and advertising matter through its Atlanta office rather than directly to exhibitors from outside the state.
206 Ga. 849, 59 S.E.2d 392 (1950).
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taxed was not in Georgia. The court relied heavily on the same Montag
income tax case which Judge Almand had used for authority in his Dan
River Mills decision, and said that "in reverse order it is a dead parallel
to the facts in the instant case." This apparent recognition by the Supreme
Court that the same concept of "doing business" is applicable under the
property tax statutes and the income tax statute before its 195o amendment would seem to indicate an affirmance of the Dan River Mills case
on the authority of the Owens-Illinois Glass Co. case.
If such a decision is forthcoming, apparently it will have little effect
in the future, because at the 195o session the legislature amended Section
92-3 113 of the Code to define expressly the term "doing business" for the
purpose of determining whether a corporation is subject to the Georgia
Income Tax Law. The far-reaching definition is as follows:
"... Every such corporation shall be deemed to be doing business within this State if it engages within this State in any activities or transactions for the purpose of financial profit or gain,
whether or not such corporation qualifies to do business in this
State, and whether or not it maintains an office or place of doing business within this State, and whether or not any such activity or1 transaction is connected with interstate or foreign commerce." 5
This definition seems broad enough to subject to Georgia income tax
the foreign manufacturing or trading corporation with Georgia activities
similar to those involved in the Dan River Mills, Lipton Tea Co., and
Owens-Illinois Glass Co. cases. Probably it was not the legislative intent
to subject to the income tax non-resident corporations whose only activities in Georgia are occasional and preliminary or incidental to investments
in loans secured by Georgia real estate, such as using intermediaries to inspect the underlying security, examine the title, disburse the loan proceeds,
and collect the principal and interest."i
The broadness of the definition suggests the question of its constitutionality. It apparently is broad enough to subject to the Georgia income
tax a non-resident corporation which engages in Georgia exclusively in
interstate commerce and whose only Georgia activities are merely incidental to the interstate business and not properly classifiable as intrastate
business. The Supreme Court of the United States has never decided clear15.
16.

Ga. Laws 1950, pp. 299, 300.
Such activities by a non-resident institutional lender, having no Georgia loan agent
who actually solicits or negotiates loans, have never been considered sufficient to
constitute "doing business" so as to give the notes secured by Georgia real estate a
Georgia tax situs for purposes of the ad valorem property tax on intangibles. Suttles
v. Associated Mortgage Companies, 193 Ga. 78, 17 S.E.2d 272 (1941); National
Mortgage Corp. v. Suttles, 194 Ga. 768, 22 S.E.2d 386 (1942) ; Davis v. Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co., 196 Ga. 304, 26 S.E.2d 618 (1943); Davis v. Penn Mutual Life Ins.
Co., 201 Ga. 821, 41 S.E.2d 406 (1947). The loans to Georgia residents are taxable
by Georgia, however, if the lender maintains a loan agent in Georgia who solicits
and handles negotiations for loans and, after approval by the home office, finally
oxecutes the loan contracts in Georgia by delivery of checks to the applicants.
Suttles v. Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Co., 193 Ga. 495, 19 S.E.2d 396 (1942) ;
Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Suttles, 201 Ga. 84, 38 S.E.2d 786 (1946),
cert. denied, 329 U.S. 801, 67 S.Ct. 489, 91 L.Ed. 684 (1947).
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ly the question whether a state can levy a net income tax on a corporation
engaged within the state solely in interstate commerce. The taxpayer in
the Dan River Mills case has raised the constitutional questions whether
to subject it to Georgia income tax would constitute a burden on interstate
commerce or a denial of due process in violation of the United States Constitution. That is why the case is going to the Georgia Supreme Court
rather than to the Court of Appeals, and conceivably it may invoke at
last a clearcut dicision of the United States Supreme Court on the federal
constitutional point. There are signs which may forecast the decision of
such an issue, or the result of an attack on the definition of "doing business"
in the 1950 amendment to the Georgia Income Tax Law. The Supreme
Court of the United States has frequently said or implied by way of dictum,
and perhaps has held once in a per curiam opinion, that a non-discriminatory state tax on the net income of a foreign corporation properly attributable to its activities in the state does not violate the United States Constitu17
tion although those activities are exclusively interstate commerce.
The i95o income tax amendment effected major changes in the formula
for apportionment to Georgia of that part of the net income of a corporation engaged in the manufacture, production, or sale of tangible personal
property attri butable to property owned or business done in Georgia, and
hence subject to the Georgia income tax under the statutory scheme. Before the amendment, Section 92-3113(3)

provided a three-factor ratio

for such apportionment of income. The three factors were:
Tangible Property Ratio-the ratio of the tangible property
(i)
owned and used in Georgia in connection with the trade or business to the
total of tangible property owned and used in connection with the trade or
business everywhere.
Salaries and Wages Ratio-the ratio of wages, salaries, commis(2)
sions, or other compensation paid or incurred in Georgia or paid in respect
17.

See United States Glue Co. v. Oak Creek, 247 U.S. 321, 38 S.Ct. 499, 62 L.Ed. 1135,
(1918); Memphis Natural Gas Co. v. Beeler, 315 U.S. 649, 656-657, 62 S.Ct. 857,
862, 86 L.Ed. 1090, 1096-1097 (1942). The per curiam opinion referred to in the
text was rendered in West Publishing Co. v. MeColgan, 328 U.S. 823, 66 S.Ct. 1363,
90 L.Ed. 1603 (1946). It consists solely of the citation of four cases; for the possible
significance of the cases cited, see Hellerstein, State Franchise Taxation of Interstate Businesses, 4 Tax L. Rev. 95, 103-106 (1948). See also Dorsey and Nesbitt,
The Georgia Corporation Income Tax and Interstate Commerce, 10 GA.B.J. 172
(1947).
The Supreme Court of the United States has declared unconstitutional as a burden
on interstate commerce a franchise tax on the privilege of doing business in the
state, measured by net income attributable to activities in the state, as applied to
a foreign corporation transacting only interstate business within the state. Alpha

Portland Cement Co. v. Massachusetts, 268 U.S. 203, 45 S.Ct. 477, 69 L.Ed. 916

(1925). Under the "direct-indirect" dichotomony, such a tax is deemed a "direct"
burden on interstate commerce, whereas the effect of an ordinary net income tax
is considered "indirect." In short, a bad subject of the tax may invalidate it although
it has a good measure (net income). This conceptualistic distinction may be demolished soon, because another state statute imposing a tax on the privilege of doing
business in the state, measured by net income, as applied to a foreign corporation
doing exclusively an interstate business, is on its way up for Supreme Court review. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit anticipated the overruling of
Alpha Portland Cement Co., and sustained the state tax statute. Spector Motor
Service, Inc. v. O'Connor, 181 F.2d 150 (2d Cir. 1950). A petition for certiorari has
been granted.
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to labor performed in Georgia in connection with the trade or business done
in Georgia to the total compensation paid or incurred by the taxpayer in
connection with its trade or business everywhere.
(3) Sales Ratio-the ratio of "sales made within this State and through,
from or by offices, agencies, branches or stores within this State" to the
total sales wherever made.
The statute provided for allocation of net income to Georgia according to the average of the three ratios.
The i95o amendment makes several changes in the formula for apportionment. First, an "average inventory ratio" is substituted for the "tangible property ratio." The new factor is the ratio of the average of the
monthly inventories held in Georgia for sale, lease, or other distribution
in connection with the trade or business of the taxpayer during the taxable
year to the average of the total monthly inventories of all products held
everywhere for such purposes. This change favors the national corporation with a manufacturing plant or other large physical plant in Georgia
at the expense of the corporation which manufactures elsewhere but maintains large inventories in Georgia warehouses. This effect is accentuated
by the provision that raw materials and goods in process shall not be
deemed "products" for the purpose of determining the average monthly
inventories. A non-resident corporation doing business in Georgia and
maintaining inventories here, but doing all its manufacturing in other
states, may well contend that the substitution of an inventory ratio for the
tangible property ratio results in allocating an unfair portion of its net
income to Georgia in that the profit on its manufacturing processes elsewhere is ignored except for some reflection in the salaries ratio. Such a
corporation might seek relief under Section 92-3115 of the Code, which
according to express provision of the i95o amendment is not repealed or
modified by it. That section allows a corporation to apply to the Revenue Commissioner for permission to base its income tax return upon some
method of allocation which it can show reflects more clearly the income
attributable to the trade or business in Georgia than does the statutory
formula. Failing in that, the corporation might attack the new formula
as so arbitrary and unreasonable as to violate the due process and equal
protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. This type of attack has been successful in the United States Supreme Court,"8 but the difficulties of proving arbitrariness are formidable,
and the tendency in the Supreme Court has been to make the requirements
for a successful attack more and more onerous."
The new inventory ratio involves practical difficulties for the corporation which does not take physical inventories as often as monthly, and
these are accentuated by the fact that monthly inventories everywhere, and
not just in Georgia, must be computed for purposes of the ratio.
The salaries and wages ratio remains about the same. Under the old
version, compensation "paid or incurred" in Georgia or "paid in respect
18. Hans Rees' Sons, Inc. v. North Carolina, 283 U.S. 123, 51 S. Ct. 385, 75 L.Ed. 879
19.

(1931).
Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain, 254 U.S. 113, 41 S.Ct. 45, 65 L.Ed. 165
(1920) ; Butler Bros. v. McColgan, 315 U.S. 501, 62 S.Ct. 701, 86 L.Ed. 991 (1942).
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to labor performed in this State" was considered Georgia compensation
to be used as the numerator of the fraction. The new version drops the
phrase, "paid in respect to labor performed in this State," and provides
that all compensation paid to residents of Georgia shall be deemed to
have been paid or incurred in this State regardless of the place of actual
payment. This closes the loophole in the case of traveling salesmen who
live in Georgia but perform a large part of their services outside the state;
their salaries clearly cannot be excluded from the numerator of the fraction by issuing their pay checks to them in another state.
The i95o amendment substitutes a "gross receipts ratio" for the old
"sales ratio." Although the two ratios are of the same general type, there
are significant differences.
The old "sales ratio" was "the percentage which the sales made within
this State and through, from or by officers, agencies, branches or stores
within this State is to the total sales wherever made." The new "gross
receipts ratio" is defined as follows"(c) Gross receipts ratio. The ratio of gross receipts from
business done within this State to total gross receipts from business done everywhere. For the purposes of this section receipts
shall be deemed to have been derived from business done within
this State only if received from products shipped to customers in
this State, or delivered within this State to customers, and in
determining the gross receipts within Georgia, receipts from
sales negotiated or effected through offices of the taxpayer outside the State and delivered from storage in the State to customers outside the State shall be excluded."
The effects of the changes can be observed most readily in terms of
specific types of transactions, which might be classified as follows:
i. Sales of products to customers in Georgia 'by shipment to Georgia
from sources of supply outside the state.-Clearly the new gross receipts
ratio classifies these as Georgia sales, whether effected through a Georgia
office or not. This was not clear under the old sales ratio, since if title
passed upon delivery to the carrier outside Georgia the interstate sale was
not strictly a sale "within" Georgia. If the sale was not solicited through
a Georgia office, it was even more difficult to consider such a transaction a
Georgia sale under the old law.
2. Sales of products to customers outside Georgia where the sale is
solicited or negotiated through a Georgia office but shipment is made from
a source of supply outside Georgia.-Clearlythe gross receipts from such
sales are not Georgia gross receipts under the new formula. The state
tax authorities attempted to include such sales as Georgia sales under the
old formula, and the legality of this is involved as a subsidiary issue in the
Dan River Mills case. A strong argument can be made that such sales were
not Georgia sales under the old law because not made "within" Georgia,
since the statute used "and" rather than "or" in specifying that the sales
be made "within this State and through, from or by" offices or branches
in the state. The clear exclusion of such sales from the Georgia numera-
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tor of the sales ratio has long been advocated by business interests in Georgia, and the elimination of the former confusion removes a handicap to the
natural advantages enjoyed by Georgia because of its strategic geographical location as a distribution and selling point for the Southeast.
3. Sales of products to customers outside Georgia 'by shipment from
sources of supply in Georgia.-In the Parke, Davis case,"' such sales were
held includable as Georgia sales where apparently title passed in Georgia
upon delivery from a Georgia warehouse to a common carrier, although
the sales were solicited by salesmen traveling out of an office outside Georgia. A 1941 amendment to Section 92-3 I 13,' not applicable to the earlier

years involved in the Parke, Davis case, provided for the exclusion from
Georgia sales of sales negotiated or effected by agents or agencies chiefly
situated at, connected with or sent out from premises outside Georgia, unless such premises were maintained merely for the purpose of reducing the
tax. The state tax authorities nevertheless continued to attempt to treat
such sales as Georgia sales where shipment from a Georgia warehouse was
involved.
The new gross receipts ratio clearly excludes from Georgia gross receipts proceeds of sales delivered to customers outside Georgia from Georgia storage but negotiated or effected through offices outside the state.
Where the sales to customers outside Georgia are not only filled from
storage in Georgia but negotiated or effected through Georgia sales offices,
their classification is not clear. The question is whether the products are
"delivered within this State to customers." Under the rationale of the
Parke, Davis case, this apparently would depend upon the law of sales as
to passage of title. If the shipment is FOB the Georgia warehouse, and
there is no agreement between the parties to the contrary, under the law
of sales title passes upon delivery to the carrier in Georgia. If, however,
the shipment is FOB the destination outside Georgia, or if the parties
agree that title shall not pass until delivery by the carrier to the purchaser,
under the law of sales title does not pass in Georgia and delivery to the
carrier in Georgia is not tantamount to a delivery to the customer in Georgia. If the statute should be so construed, corporations handling this type
of transaction might well examine whether the savings in income tax would
justify the insurance premiums involved in bearing the risk of loss of the
goods until delivery by the carrier to the customer outside Georgia. It
does not seem practical for an income tax apportionment formula to depend upon such niceties, and it would be easy to find a legislative intent to
treat as Georgia sales only those involving actual physical delivery to customers in this state except for the special proviso excluding sales to customers outside Georgia from storage in Georgia where negotiated or effected through offices outside Georgia. The desirability of excluding all
such sales, regardless of the location of the sales office, is indicated by the
principle that a fair sales ratio is one which, if adopted in all states, would
result in the inclusion of no more than ioo percent of all sales in the sum
of all numerators of the various state ratios. If the Georgia ratio includes
20. Parke, Davis & Company v. Cook, 198 Ga. 457, 31 S.E.2d 728 (1944).
21. Ga. Laws 1941, pp. 210, 215, GA. CODE ANN. § 92-3113 (Supp. 1947).
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sales to customers in Alabama of products delivered to a carrier in Georgia for shipment to Alabama, it does not measure up to that principle of
fairness. As we have seen, the Georgia ratio clearly includes as Georgia receipts all proceeds from sales of products shipped to customers in Georgia.
If Alabama adopted the same ratio, it would include as Alabama sales
those involving shipments to Alabama customers from Georgia by a seller
doing business in Alabama, and yet Georgia would include the same sales
as Georgia sales under the construction that delivery to a carrier in Georgia is equivalent to delivery to the customer, unless the particular sales
were negotiated or effected through a sales office outside Georgia.
Where income is derived from a business "other than the manufacture,
production or sale of tangible personal property, or from the holding or
sale of intangible property," the new subsection (S) of Section 92-3113
provides that the net income shall be apportioned within and without the
state under rules and regulations of the State Revenue Commissioner, in
the ratio that the business within the state is to the total business. This
replaces former provisions for apportioning the tax on the basis of only
two of the statutory ratios if the other was inapplicable, or on the basis
of only one ratio if the other two were inappropriate.
The new Section 92-3113 is effective for all corporation income tax re-

turns made for the calendar year 1949 or for any fiscal year ending after
January I, i95o. It is to be hoped that new regulations will soon be
promulgated by the State Revenue Commissioner to assist in clarifying
some of the many questions raised by the amendment.
At the 195o regular session, the legislature also amended Code Section
92-31o5 to exempt from income tax trusts exempt from federal income
taxes under Section 16S(a) of the Internal Revenue Code, which deals
with pension and profit-sharing trusts for employees..2 2 The legislature
did not adopt any provision governing the deductibility of contributions by
employers to such trusts corresponding to Section 23(p) of the Internal
Revenue Code, or any provisions governing whether such contributions are
taxable to the employees at once or only when distributed to them. The
deductibility of such contributions within the bounds of reasonable compensation apparently has not been challenged by the State Revenue De22.

Ga. Laws 1950, p. 75. The Intangibles Tax Act was also amended to exempt such
employees' trusts from intangibles tax. Ga. Laws 1950, p. 74.
Another income tax amendment provides for deduction of United States income
taxes by veterans on their Georgia returns for corresponding years even though
because of military service the federal tax was not paid until a later year, provided
it was paid within the time prescribed by federal law. Claims for refund on this
basis may be filed by veterans within 12 months from January 26, 1950, the date
of enactment of the amendment, or within 12 months from the date of last payment
as prescribed by federal law. Ga. Laws 1950, p. 16.
The Rural Telephone Cooperative Act, providing for the formation of non-profit
rural telephone corporations, exempts corporations doing business under that act
from state income and excise taxes except for an annual fee of $10.00. Ga. Laws
1950, pp. 192, 218.
Amendments to the Georgia Unemployment Compensation Law include increased
reductions of the rate of employers' contributions on account of merit rating. The
effective rate can now be as low as 0.25% of compensation. The former minimum
was 0.50%. Ga. Laws 1950, p. 38.

MERCER LAW REVIEW

IVol. 2

partment, but in view of the large number of such trusts involving many
employees it is unfortunate that the tax consequences from the employee's
standpoint were not clarified.
PROPERTY TAXES

In connection with the discussion of the Dan River Mills income tax
case, reference has already been made to the decision of the Supreme
Court of Georgia in Suttles v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co.,2" involving 1941
state and county ad volorem property taxes on accounts receivable of a
non-resident corporation. The accounts arose out of the sale of goods to
residents of Georgia on orders taken by Georgia sales offices of the corporation, but the orders expressly provided that they were subject to approval by the home office in Ohio, and title to goods sold to Georgia residents passed to the purchasers upon delivery to the common carrier in
Ohio. On these facts the Supreme Court held that the corporation was not
doing business in Georgia so as to make Georgia the proper tax situs of
the accounts. The general rule, said the court, is that intangibles are taxable in the state where the owner resides; the exception is that a debt
of a citizen of a state owned by a non-resident and held at his domicile in
another state is taxable in the state of the debtor's residence if it accrues
out of or is an incident to property owned or a business conducted by
the non-resident or his agent in that state. The question, therefore, was
whether soliciting and promotional activities through a Georgia sales office constituted doing business for this purpose. Most of the prior Georgia
law on this subject had developed in cases involving attempts to tax real
estate mortgage notes held by non-resident institutional lenders. In the
case of one such lender, Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Company,
the Supreme Court of Georgia had held the loans subject to a Georgia ad
valorem property tax because of the activities of a local loan agent, although his authority was limited to soliciting loans and carrying out specific instructions of the home office as to each separate loan.2" In that case
the court had said that the Georgia Constitution and statutes express an
intention to levy a tax upon all property which the state has jurisdiction to tax, and that the decisions have not drawn any line anywhere this
side of the constitutional due process barrier.25 Particularly because of
certain indications that the United States Supreme Court had broadened
its view of the scope of a state's jurisdiction to tax intangibles, 6 the Northwestern Mutual case might have given the Fulton County Tax Collector
23. 206 Ga. 849, 59 S.E.2d 392 (1950).
24. Suttles v. Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Co., 193 Ga. 495, 19 S.E.2d 396 (1942)
Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Suttles, 201 Ga. 84, 38 S.E.2d 786 (1946),
cert. denied, 329 U.S. 801, 67 S.Ct. 489, 91 L.Ed. 684 (1947). Four justices disqualified themselves for the first decision of the Supreme Court of Georgia; two for
the second.
25. 193 Ga. 495, 506-507, 19 S.E.2d 396, 404 (1942).
26. Compare Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Fox, 298 U.S. 193, 56 S.Ct. 773, 80 L.Ed. 1143
(1936), with Curry v. McCanless, 307 U.S. 357, 59 S.Ct. 900, 83 L.Ed. 1339 (1939),
and State Tax Comm'n. of Utah v. Aldrich, 316 U.S. 174, 62 S.Ct. 1008, 86 L.Ed.
1358 (1942). More recently there are signs that the United States Supreme Court
is tightening up its concepts of taxability of intangibles again. Cf. Wheeling Steel
Corp. v. Glander, 337 U.S. 562, 69 S.Ct. 1291, 93 L.Ed. 1544 (1949).
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some confidence as to the outcome of the Owens-Illinois case. The Georgia
Supreme Court had already indicated, however, that relaxation of federal
due process requirements could not relieve it of its duty to apply the due
process clause of the Georgia constitution to the taxability of intangibles
by Georgia."7 And the court refused to extend the Northwestern Mutual
holding to the fact situation in the Owens-Illinois case, involving only soliciting activities in Georgia. The Northwestern Mutual case was distinguished with the comment that it involved deliveries in Georgia, since the
local loan agent delivered the checks to borrowers upon approval of loans
by the home office. 8Tile question whether accounts receivable have a tax situs in Georgia,
of course, is not nearly so important from a financial standpoint since the
recent classification of accounts receivable, as well as notes not secured by
real estate, for taxation at the rate of $3.00 per $i,ooo of value, rather
than at the
much higher rates applicable to real estate and other tangible
2
property. 1

The only other appellate decision involving taxation of intangibles 'during the period under survey was Redwine. v. Southern Co.3" This was an
action by a public utilities holding company for a declaratory judgment as
to the applicability to a domesticated foreign corporation of the constitutional and statutory provisions exempting from ad valorem intangibles
taxes the common voting stock of a subsidiary corporation not doing business in Georgia, if at least 90 per cent of such common voting stock is
owned by a Georgia corporation with its principal place of business in
Georgia and was acquired or is held for the purpose of enabling the
parent company to carry on some part of its established line of business
through such subsidiary.31 The Supreme Court of Georgia held that the
exemption applies to a foreign corporation domesticated in Georgia as
fully and completely as to a corporation created under the laws of Georgia. While recognizing that the domestication of a foreign corporation
is not equivalent to incorporation and does not create a Georgia corporation, the court stressed that by Code Section 22-i6oi the legislature has
provided that a domesticated corporation shall have the same powers,
privileges, and immunities as similar corporations created under the laws
of Georgia. The Revenue Commissioner contended that Section 22-i6o
could not extend the exemption to a domesticated corporation, because of
27.

National Mortgage Corp. v. Suttles, 194 Ga. 768, 771-773, 22 S.E.2d 386, 388-389
(1942); Davis v. Penn Mutual Life Ins. Co., 198 Ga. 550, 558-562, 32 S.E.2d 180,
184-186 (1944).
28. The decision in Colgate-Palmolive-Peet Co. v. Davis, 196 Ga. 681, 27 S.E.2d 326
(1943), holding a non-resident corporation subject to Georgia taxes on its accounts
receivable from Georgia customers, where it maintained an emergency warehouse
in Georgi-, was distinguished on the same ground. On October 14, 1949, in Americon Smuff Co. v. Suttlcs, the Superior Court of Fulton County directed a verdict
against the taxpayer and held its accounts receivable from brokers in Georgia subject to Georgia property taxes because the taxpayer's salesmen carried small quantities of goods with them for direct sale to Georgia retailers, even though otherwise
orders were subject to approval by the home office in Memphis, Tenn. CCH Ga. Tax
Rep. V 28-003.
29. Ga. Laws 1949, p. 1050.
30. 206 Ga. 377, 57 S.E.2d 194, 12 GA.B.J. 483 (1950).
31. GA. CONST. Art. VII, § 1. 1 4, GA. CODE ANN. § 2-5404 (1948 Rev.) ; Ga. Laws 1946,
p. 12, GA. CODE ANN. § 92-130 (Supp. 1947).
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the constitutional provision that "laws exempting property from taxation,
other than the property herein enumerated, shall be void,I'' 2 but the
court rejected this argument with the explanation that the statute does
not have the effect of "exempting property from taxation other than the
property . . . enumerated" in the constitutional provision, but simply
exempts the same property therein enumerated whether owned by a Georgia corporation or a domesticated foreign corporation. It would seem
to the writer, however, that Section 22-i6oi could not affect the constitutional provision except in so far as its existence at the time the 1945
Constitution was adopted might bear on whether the framers of that constitution intended the term "Georgia corporation" to include a domesticated foreign corporation. The court went on to say that to so construe
the constitutional provision as to confine its application to property owned
by a Georgia corporation and to deny its application to the same class of
property when owned by a domesticated foreign corporation would offend
various provisions of the state and federal constitutions, raising the interesting question whether a constitutional provision can be unconstitutional
as violating another provision of the same constitution. Probably the
court did not mean to suggest this but rather was seeking a construction
of a particular constitutional provision which would fit into the general
pattern of the constitution.::'
The approach of the Supreme Court in the Southern Co. case seems in4 adopting the opinconsistent with its decision in Davis v. City of tlanta,"
ion of Fulton Superior Court Judge Ralph Pharr holding that property
of wholesale produce dealers doing business at the Georgia State Farmers
Market was not exempt from city ad valorent taxes as public property,
although the businesses were carrid on as a part of the operation of the
market as a state agency. Judge Pharr relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in Board of Trustees of the Gate City Guard v. City of Atlanta," holding that the devotion of private property exclusively to a public
use cannot convert it into public property within the meaning of the constitutional provision authorizing the legislature to exempt public property
from taxation, and that an act of the legislature declaring that privately
owned armories shall be public property and exempt from taxation was
unconstitutional. He distinguished Newton v. City of Atlanta,6 holding
that the city had no power to impose an occupation tax on produce dealers
conducting their business entirely in the State Farmers Market, on the
ground that the tax sought to be imposed there was in substance a tax on
a state function or instrumentality and not a property tax.
The Court of Appeals also had before it last year a case involving an
exemption from property taxes-the homestead exemption. In Jones v.
Johnson," that court held that the owner of a farm who resides in a dwell32. GA. CONST. Art VII, § 1, 1 4, GA. CODE ANN. § 2-5404 (1948 Rev.).
33. Justices Wyatt and Atkinson dissented on the ground that the case was not a proper
one for application of the declaratory judgment statute. Justice Head, in a special
concurrence, agreed, but thought this point had not been raised properly.
34. 206 Ga. 652, 58 S.E.2d 140 (1950).
35. 113 Ga. 883, 39 S.E. 394 (1901).
36. 189 Ga. 441, 6 S.E.2d 61 (1939).
37. 80 Ga. App. 340, 55 S.E.2d 904 (1949).
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ing on the farm is entitled to a homestead exemption as to the entire tract
of land upon which the dwelling is situated, up to a maximum value of
$2,ooo, although he devotes the contiguous land to agricultural purposes.
Farming is not a "commercial purpose" so as to disqualify the contiguous
land under the limitation respecting use of the property, a" said the court,
and there is no limitation of the homestead exemption as to physical size,
the maximum valuation having been intended to equalize the exemption on
the basis of value regardless of the extent of the tract involved.
In the latest case in a long series involving a Georgia corporation's claim
to an exemption from ad valorern taxes by terms of its legislative charter,
the Georgia Railroad & Banking Company again ran into the doctrine of
state immunity from suit, and a suit in the federal district court against
the State Revenue Commissioner to enjoin collection of ad valorem taxes
was dismissed as in effect a suit against the state to compel specific performance of a contract."' The appeal to the United States Supreme Court
was continued by that court in a per curiain opinion reciting that the Attorney General of Georgia had stated at the bar of the court that plain,
speedy and efficient state remedies were available to the corporation, and
concluding that the cause should be continued for such period as will enable the corporation to assert such remedies."
In Whitehead v. Kennedy4 ' the question before the Supreme Court of
Georgia was whether a right held by the taxpayer constituted property so
as to be subject to ad valorein taxes. The court held that a lease conveying the right for four years to cut and box pine trees on certain premises
for the purpose of extracting gum to be distilled into turpentine did not
convey an interest in land but gave the lessee a mere usufruct not subject
to property taxes. The decision was based on precedents in non-tax cases
involving turpentine leases and licenses to cut timber." The court distinguished the case of a conveyance of title to growing trees with only the fee
in the soil remaining in the grantor. 3
One county, Fulton, has taken advantage of the provision of the Georgia Constitution of 1945 permitting the General Assembly to authorize
counties to levy taxes to provide for workmen's compensation for county
employees4 4 and the subsequent resolution of the General Assembly amending Section 92-370I of the Code to authorize county taxes for workmen's
compensation, by obtaining an amendment of Section I 14-10I of the
Code to define "employer" under the workmen's compensation law in every
county having a population of 300,000 or more to cover all political diGA. CODE ANN. § 92-233 (3) (Supp. 1947).
39. Georgia Railroad & Banking Co. v. Redwine, 85 F. Supp. 749 (N.D. Ga. 1949). The
corporation had previously encountered the same doctrine in the state courts. Musgrove v. Georgia Railroad & Banking Co., 204 Ga. 139, 49 S.E.2d 26 (1948), pp)eal
dismissed, 335 U.S. 900, 69 S.Ct. 298, 93 L.Ed. 199 (1949).
40. As indicated in footnote 39, the corporation's most recent search for a remedy in
the state courts was not successful.
41. 206 Ga. 760, 58 S.E.2d 832 (1950).
42. Johnson v. Truitt, 122 Ga. 327, 50 S.E. 135 (1905); Lott v. Denton, 146 Ca. 3G3,
91 S.E. 113 (1917) ; Treisch v. Doster, 171 Ga. 525, 156 S.E. 231 (1930).
43. North Georgia Co. v. Bebee, 128 Ga. 563, 57 S.E. 873 (1907).
44. GA. CONST. Art. VII, § 4, V1, GA. CODE ANN. § 2-5701 (1948 Rev.).
45. Ga. Laws 1946, p. 87, GA. CODE ANN. § 92-3701 (Supp. 1947).
38.
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visions of the state, including school districts." This amendment, which
was proposed by the Fulton County Board of Education, was considered
necessary because the previous statute defining "employer" for purposes
of the workmen's compensation law as including political subdivisions of
the state was declared unconstitutional before the adoption of the 1945
Constitution on the ground that it conflicted with limitations in the 1877
Constitution upon the purposes for which the General Assembly could
authorize counties to levy taxes.' Itis doubtful whether the 1945 Constitution can apply retroactively to validate the earlier statute,48 so the Fulton
County Board of Education wanted a reenactment of the provision classifying iulton County as an employer under the workmen's compensation
law.
Two recent cases involved the procedure for assessment of ad valorem
taxes and review of assessments. In City of Griffin v. Southeastern Textile
Co.49 the Court of Appeals held that under a city charter provision for
the appeal of a tax assessment from the city taxing authorities to the
supeiior court, there to be disposed o "as other appeal cases," the appeal
is a de, )lo 'o investigation and brings ipthe whole record to be tried anew
in the superior court, and that any issue that could be made before the
tax authorities originally hearing the case may be made in the superior
Court on such appeal. Furthermore, the court held, although in a proceding for equitable relief against a discriminatory tax assessment the
taxpayer must show an intentional and systematic assessment of his
property at a valuation substantially higher than that of other and similar
property," here the taxpayer had a legal remedy provided by statute and,
apparently, need show in the superior court only discrimination, whether
intentional or otherwise.
In Garr v.E. W. Banks Co.:" the Supreme Court of Georgia held that
the statute"- which requires the county boards of tax assessors to complete

their revision and assessment of the returns of taxpayers in the respective
counties by June i of each year is designed to promote system, uniformity
and dispatch of their work and that of the tax receiver, so that a complete
digest may be submitted to the State Revenue Commissioner for examination and approval, and is directory only. The statute does not deprive the
boards of power and authority to perform their duties after June i, so
that a county board of tax assessors could properly increase after
June I the values placed by taxpayers upon such items as "notes and
accounts" and "stocks of merchandise." The court considered the taxpayers who returned such items at less than their value as defaulters. Justice Atkinson dissented, taking the view that such an item should be treated
as a single composite unit for taxation, that the authorities can question
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Ga. Laws 1950, p. 324.
Kelley v. County of Newton, 198 Ga. 483, 32 S.E.2d 99 (1944).
Cf. Christian v. Morland, 203 Ga. 20, 45 S.E.2d 201 (1947) ; Atkinson v. Southern
Express Co., 94 S.C. 444, 78 S.E. 516 (1913).
79 Ga. App. 420, 53 S.E.2d 921 (1949).
Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Suttles, 201 Ga. 84, 38 S.E.2d 786 (1946),
cert. denied, 329 U.S. 801, 67 S.Ct. 489, 91 L.Ed. 684 (1947) ; Hardin v. Reynolds,
189 Ga. 534, 6 S.E.2d 328 (1939).
206 Ga. 831, 59 S.E.2d 400 (1950).
GA. CODE ANN. § 92-6917 (Supp. 1947).
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the accuracy of the value placed on any such item by a taxpayer but that
the taxpayer who returns such an item is not a defaulter even though his
valuation is too low, and that the right of the tax assessors to question
the value of such items expires on June I of each year. Otherwise, Justice
Atkinson pointed out, a taxpayer must return an itemized statement of
every article owned in order to prevent his ad valorem tax liability being
held in abeyance for a period of seven years.
LICENSE AND OCCUPATION TAXES

Attempts by municipal authorities to increase city revenue by multiplication of license and occupational taxes met with no success in the Georgia
appellate courts this past year. The Supreme Court struck down a "double
tax" in two instances. In Mlayor of Savannah v. Savannah Electri? & Power
Co.

3

the Supreme Court refused to construe a city ordinance as subjecting

a public transit system to an annual tax applicable to each bus of iopassenger or larger capacity in addition to a special annual tax on street
railroad companies based on mileage covered by their routes. The court
indicated that a statute will not be construed as imposing a double tax
unless required by its express terms. In striking down a municipal ordinance
imposing an occupational tax on motion picture theatres measured by a
percentage of admission prices, where the theatres were already subject
to a flat annual tax, the court spoke out even more strongly against the
double tax, saying that it is "well settled that a municipality may levy only
one license tax or occupation tax against a business for the period covered
by the tax, usually one year.""
In Chandler v. City of Tifton55 a license tax was held invalid because
its true purpose was not a legitimate revenue purpose. A special annual
tax of $5,000 on retail wine dealers was struck down as unreasonable on
the principle that a city may not impose a prohibitory tax on a lawful
business and that an ordinance adopted pursuant to the charter power
to tax must tend to effectuate and not to defeat the purpose of raising
revenue.
On the other hand, in Ashley v. City of Greensboro,56 an ordinance providing for parking meters was upheld because its purpose was regulation
rather than the production of revenue. To establish that a parking, meter
ordinance is a revenue measure and hence invalid, said the Supreme Court,
it must appear that its scheme is such that receipts will continuously and
substantially exceed the cost of installation, maintenance, and regulation,
whereas here the taxpayers attacking the ordinance alleged that the parking
meters produced a deficit.
The Court of Appeals, in City of Griffin v. First Federal Savings &
Loan Ass'n.," construed the word "franchise" as used in Section 16-427
of the Code," exempting certain building and loan associations from taxa53.
54.

205 Ga. 429, 54 S.E.2d 260 (1949).
Publix-Lucas Theatres, Inc. v. City of Brunswick, 206 Ga. 206, 211, 56 S.E.2d 254,
258 (1949).
55. 206 Ga. 43, 55 S.E.2d 568 (1949).
56. 206 Ga. 800, 58 S.E.2d 815 (1950).
57. 80 Ga. App. 217, 55 S.E.2d 771 (1949).
58. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-427 (Supp. 1947).
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tion on "franchise, capital, reserve surplus. loans, shares, or accounts," in
its loose and general sense as being synonymous with "license" or "occupation," and accordingly held invalid a city ordinance levying a license tax
upon such associations. Judges Felton and MacIntyre dissented on the
ground that "franchise" should be construed as having its true or technical
meaning of a special privilege constituting a property interest.
Meanwhile, the legislature simplified the system of license fees for insurance companies and agent's by imposing an annual license fee of $ 3 00
on each insurance company carrying on an insurance business in Georgia in
lieu of all other license fees and an occupation tax of $io on each agent
or manager regardless of the number of counties in which such agents
operate."
EXwIsE TAXEs
The principal development in the field of excise taxation was the increase in the rates of tax on motor fuel, tobacco products and alcoholic
beverages, discussed at the beginning of this study.
In the only appellate decision in this field during the period of this
survey, the Supreme Court of Georgia reaffirmed the principle that the
Twenty-first Amendment to the United States Constitution renders the
due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment
and the interstate commerce clause inoperative with respect to intoxicating
liquors.' Consequently, a statute taxing wines made in Georgia from
Georgia products at substantially lower rates than wines manufactured
in Georgia from imported raw materials does not violate any of those
constitutional provisions.
At the regular session in 195o, the legislature passed an act providing
for refund of all of the state tax on gasoline except one cent per gallon to
any person who purchases gasoline in quantities of 25 gallons or more
and uses it in operating watercraft upon navigable waters." So long as
revenues from gasoline taxes are not allocated to the highway program,
there seems little justification for this privilege.
CONCLUSION
Two observations are prompted by the year of Georgia tax law under
review:
First, the appellate courts of Georgia very properly confine their decisions to the scope of legitimate construction of taxing statutes. There is
no judicial legislation of the sort which has caused confusion in the federal
tax field.
Second, the appellate courts of Georgia would be called on to decide
many less tax cases if legislative drafting were done more carefully and
thoughtfully.
59. Ga. Laws 1950, p. 122.

60. Capitol Distributing Co. v. Redwine, 206 Ga. 477, 57 S.E.2d 578 (1950).
61. Ga. Laws 1950, p. 3.
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POSTSCRIPT

On October 9, 1950, the Supreme Court of Georgia decided the case of
Redwine v. Dan River Mills, Inc., after the discussion of the facts and
previous history of that case in the section of this article on Georgia income tax developments had been written. With all the justices concurring
except Justice Almand, who had ruled on demurrers in the case in the
superior court and thus was disqualified, the Supreme Court affirmed the
judgment for the taxpayer. Justice Wyatt reasoned in a very short opinion
for the Court that the principles laid down recently in the Owens-Illinois
Glass Co. 12 case, involving the question of what constitutes doing business

for purposes of property taxation of accounts receivable, must be applied
to the question in the Dan River Mills case of what constitutes doing business for purposes of the Georgia corporate income tax. As noted earlier
in this article, the Georgia legislature amended Section 92-3I13 of the
Code in i95o to define "doing business" for purposes of the income tax in
such a way that it is doubtful whether the Dan River Mills decision will
have much effect in the future with regard to the corporate income tax.
There has been much speculation, however, as to the amount of income
tax refunds for past years to which taxpayers will be entitled as a result of
the Dan River Mills decision if it is not changed on a rehearing.
62.

Suttles v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co., 206 Ga. 849, 59 S.E.2d 392 (1950). This
is also discussed in the text of this article, supra, pp. 223, 230.
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